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Abstract
We consider new three player games to test existing models of fairness. Our games consist of a
proposer who offers an allocation of $10 between two players, either himself and the responder or
the responder and a third party. In each case, the responder either accepts or rejects this allocation. In
case of a rejection, the player who was not part of the initial division (the third party and the proposer,
respectively) receives a rejection payoff (of $0, $5 or $10, depending on the game). Our results cast
some doubt on existing fairness theories.
© 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classiﬁcation: C91; C78
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1. Introduction
There is considerable evidence that considerations of fairness affect economic behavior.
Fairness is prominent in bilateral negotiations and has found its way into the economics
literature via the numerous experiments on the ultimatum game (see G¨ uth et al., 1982 and
foranoverviewRoth,1995).Moreover,theoreticalandempiricalworkhasshownthateven
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in market settings fairness considerations can play an important role.1 This abundance and
importance of fairness behavior has been addressed by models of social preferences that
assume that people do not care solely about their own material payoff.
It is possible to distinguish between two types of models of social preferences. The ﬁrst
type contains models in which people care about the distributions of payoffs, whereas in
the second type people care about the intentions of other players and are motivated by
reciprocity.
One class of prominent models of distributional concerns posits that people care about
their own payoff and how it compares to other people’s payoff. Speciﬁcally, people are
“difference averse”: they do not like their payoff to fall behind (and to a lesser extent
not to be ahead too).2 This implies that a player may reduce her payoff if this leads to a
reduction in the other players’ payoff and reduces payoff inequality, but she would never
sacriﬁcetoincreasepayoffinequality.Alternativemodelsofdistributionalconcernscontain
preferences for maximizing social surplus and helping low-payoff players more than high-
payoff players.3
According to reciprocity based models, people are motivated not only by their ﬁnal
outcomes, but also by the way the outcome has been achieved. A player cares about the
intentionthatdrivesanactionandmaybewillingtosacriﬁcematerialpayofftoreciprocate,
rewarding fair behavior and punishing unfair behavior (see Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger, in press; Falk and Fischbacher, 1999).
Models of payoff distribution recently gained much attention due to the pioneering
work of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). They successfully
model simple preferences for distributional concerns that account for behavior in many
experiments,evenexperimentsthatpreviouslyhavebeenviewedasshowingtheimportance
of reciprocity concerns.4
In this paper, we ﬁrst present a comprehensive deﬁnition of outcome-based preferences
that subsequently allows us to test the explanatory power of outcome-based preferences
versus preferences that include intentionality concerns.
2. Fairness models
Models of distributional preferences of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000) assume that the utility ui(x) of an outcome x =( x1, ..., xi, ..., xn) for
players of the game depends on player i’s own payoff xi and how xi compares to the other
players’ payoffs xj. Players’ preferences therefore depend only on the outcomes of the
game and not on the way they have been achieved. This feature makes it easy to apply such
models and use them to make speciﬁc predictions about games.
1 Kahneman et al. (1986); Fehr et al. (1993); Fehr et al. (1997).
2 Ochs and Roth (1989); Loewenstein et al. (1989); Bolton (1991); Kirchsteiger (1994); Fehr et al. (1998);
Fehr and Schmidt (1999); Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).
3 Charness and Rabin (2002).
4 The most striking example being the gift exchange game, for example Fehr et al. (1993).Y. Bereby-Meyer, M. Niederle / J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 56 (2005) 173–186 175
Subsequently, there have been many attempts to show the importance of intentions and
reciprocity concerns (i.e., the way outcomes have been achieved) by generating empirical
results that distributional preferences cannot account for. A typical example is a study by
Falk et al. (2003) on a mini ultimatum game. They show that the unequal offer of (8,2),
where 8 is for the proposer and 2 for the responder, is much more likely to be rejected
if the proposer could have proposed an equal offer (5,5) than if the proposer could have
proposed only an even more unequal offer, such as (10,0). This ﬁnding suggests that the
acceptability of an offer is inﬂuenced by the set of available offers and not just by the set of
ﬁnal outcomes the responder chooses from. In this example, the set the responder chooses
fromafteranofferof8:2isinbothcases8:2incaseofacceptanceand0:0incaseofrejection.
The authors interpret this ﬁnding as indicating that, depending on the available alternatives
for the proposer, identical offers signal different intentions of the proposer and view this
experiment as evidence for the importance of “intentions.” Similarly, Nelson (2002) shows
that limiting the maximum offer in a $20 ultimatum game to $4 increases the acceptance
of $4, indicating that intentions matter.
There are, however, attempts to reconcile such evidence with models of distributional
preferences. Bolton and Ockenfels (in press) present a variant of their original model in
which they assume that the “reference point” of fair behavior is the equal split outcome
only if this is a feasible outcome. In case an equal split is not possible, the outcome that
is closest to the equal split serves as the reference point for the outcome that is perceived
as fair. Therefore, in the experiment above by Falk et al. (2003), when the proposer has to
decidebetween(8,2)and(10,0),theoutcome(8,2)istheclosesttotheequalsplitandhence
is perceived as fair and should be often accepted. However, when the proposer chooses
between (8,2) and (5,5), the equal split is feasible and the outcome (8,2) becomes unfair
and less acceptable. Thereby, Bolton and Ockenfels (in press) provide an explanation based
solely on the distribution of outcomes without having to model the players’ intentions.
The numerous attempts to show the limitations of distributional preferences emphasize
the necessity for a clear deﬁnition of such models. In this paper, we give a precise deﬁnition
ofwhatweviewasthemostgeneralpossibleoutcome-basedpreferences.Theseshallretain
theﬂavorofoutcomebasedmodelsinthat,althoughthewholepayoffspacemayberelevant
for determining preferences over speciﬁc outcomes, the strategy choices that lead to these
outcomes shall not be relevant for preferences.
Deﬁnition. Social preferences are purely distributional if the preferences of the agent
solely depend on (xi, x−i, X) where X = {x:x are possible material payoff distributions of
the game} and if for all permutations σ of {1, 2, ..., n} such that σ (i)=i we have ui(x, X)
= ui(σ(x), σ(X)) where σ(X)={σ(x): x   X}.
Player i has distributional social preferences if she only cares about how much she
receives and about the distribution of payoffs among other players. We allow for these
preferences to depend on the set of possible payoff distributions.5 However, the fact that
player i’s preferences have to be invariant to permutations among other players means
5 A ﬁrst step in this direction can be found in Bolton and Ockenfels (in press).176 Y. Bereby-Meyer, M. Niederle / J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 56 (2005) 173–186
that player i’s preferences about player j’s payoff cannot depend on the actions taken by
player j.
Alldistributionalmodelspresentedintheliteraturesofararespecialcasesofourgeneral
deﬁnition. This includes Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and the
ﬁrst part of Charness and Rabin (2002). Furthermore, models of intentionality do not fulﬁl
this deﬁnition, since their essence is that a player i treats player j depending on the actions
of player j.
Studies on the limitations of outcome based models, such as Falk et al. (2003), based
their conclusions on changes in behavior across two games, where the two games differ
in the set of possible payoff distributions. This leaves two possible explanations for the
change in behavior. One possibility is that players care about the whole set of possible
payoff distributions and hence have slightly more general outcome-based preferences than
the ones described in the original models. The other possibility is that players care about
other players’ actions and intentions.
Therefore,totestthelimitationsofdistributionalmodels,weconsiderpairsofgamesthat
leave the payoff distributions across games constant. This implies that changes in behavior
across these games cannot be attributed to preferences over outcomes.
Models of intentionality assume that the way player i cares about the payoff of player
j depends on i’s beliefs about player j’s “kindness” towards i. If player j is kind towards
player i, then player i receives an increase in utility as player j’s payoffs increases (positive
reciprocity). Analogously player i prefers to decrease player j’s payoffs when player j is
unkind to player i (negative reciprocity). The models mainly differ in their deﬁnition of
“kind” actions.
Pure reciprocity models have also been experimentally rejected. For example, in the
context of sequential dilemma games, Bolton et al. (1998) found only secondary and in-
signiﬁcant evidence for reciprocity.
The experiment reported here consists of three pairs of games with complete informa-
tion. Within each pair we keep the set of possible payoff distributions constant. We ﬁnd
differencesinbehaviorindifferentconditions,althoughthedistributionofpayoffsremained
constant. These experimental results cannot be explained by outcome-based preferences.
Although some of our results can serve as evidence for the importance of intentions, others
are not consistent with intentionality models either.
3. The experiment
Inordertotestwhetherthepayoffdistributionssufﬁcetoexplainfairnessconsiderations,
weconsidertwodifferenttypesofthreeplayergames.Ineachgame,thereisaproposer(P),
a responder (R) and a third party (T). The proposer makes an offer to divide $10 between
two players, where offers have to give at least $1 to each of the two players. In the ﬁrst
class of games (third-party rejection payoff games or TRP) the proposer offers to divide
$10 between herself and the responder. In case the responder accepts the offer, the division
is implemented. In case the responder rejects, both she and the proposer receive nothing,
and the third party receives a rejection payoff. Depending on the game, this rejection payoff
is $0, $5 or $10 (the whole pie). Note that if the rejection payoff is $0, the game reduces toY. Bereby-Meyer, M. Niederle / J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 56 (2005) 173–186 177
a regular ultimatum game between the proposer and the responder, with a third player who
neverreceivesanypayoff,regardlessoftheactionstaken.Incasetherejectionpayoffis$10,
the game also almost reduces to a regular ultimatum game between the proposer and the
responder.Thedifferenceisthatnormally,incaseofrejection,thepiegoesbacktotheexper-
imenter,whereasinthiscaseitgoestoathirdpartywhoisanothersubjectintheexperiment.
Inthesecondclassofgames(proposerrejectionpayoffgameorPRP)theproposermakes
an offer to divide $10 between the responder and the third party. In case the responder
accepts the offer, the division is implemented. In case the responder rejects, both she and
the third party receive nothing, and the proposer receives a rejection payoff. Depending on
the treatment, this rejection payoff is again $0, $5 or $10 (the whole pie).
4. Experimental design and procedures
Ninety participants were run in 4 sessions of 24, 18, 18 and 30 participants. At the
beginning of the experiment participants were randomly assigned to one of the three roles,
which they kept during the whole experiment. Participants played all six games (the two
types of games with the three different amounts of rejection payoff each). Each game was
played ﬁve times, and in each repetition a player was randomly matched to two other
players to create groups that consisted of one proposer, one responder, and one third party.
The games were played in two orders so that two sessions began with the TRP games and
thetwoothersessionsbeganwiththePRPgames.Theexperimentwascomputerized,using
the Ztree software (Fischbacher, 1998). Within each class of games, participants played the
three versions in the following order, starting with rejection payoff of $10, then $0, then
$5. The proposer did not receive any feedback about the choice of the responder so that
their decisions could not be inﬂuenced by responders during the game. Subjects received
$10 show up fee and the outcome of three randomly selected games. The session lasted for
about one and a half hours and participants earned on average $19.5.
5. Predictions and results
We ﬁrst focus our attention on the behavior of the responder having received an offer of
10 − x, where x   {1, 2, ...,9 }. In games in which the third party receives the rejection
payoff the share x is for the proposer whereas it is the share of the third party in the games
where the proposer receives the rejection payoff.
5.1. Distributional models
For a given rejection payoff, theories in which the preferences of players depend only
on the payoff distribution must make the same predictions for the PRP games and for the
TRP games concerning the behavior of the responder.
For example, consider a rejection payoff of $10 along with the offer of 10 − x for the
responder. The responder has to choose whether to accept or to reject the offer. As can be
seen in Table 1, in both games the responder has to choose between the same two payoff178 Y. Bereby-Meyer, M. Niederle / J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 56 (2005) 173–186
Table 1
Possible payoff distributions after a 10 − x proposal for the TRP-$10 and PRP-$10
TRP PRP
Accept Reject Accept Reject
Proposer x 00 1 0
Responder 10 − x 01 0 − x 0
Third party 0 10 x 0
distributions. Consider the TRP game where the third party receives the rejection payoff. If
the responder accepts the offer, then the payoffs are (x,10 − x,0) for (proposer, responder,
third party); if she rejects the offer, the payoffs are (0,0,10). In the PRP games where the
proposer receives the rejection payoff, the responder decides between (0,10 − x,x) in case
of acceptance and (10,0,0) in case of rejection.
Outcome based models of difference aversion such as of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and
BoltonandOckenfels(2000)makefurtherpredictionsdependingonthesizeoftherejection
payoff.
The utility function of Fehr and Schmidt involves a comparison of the subjects’ own
payoff xi to the payoff of all the other subjects, where subjects have a stronger distaste for
their payoff falling behind than being ahead. Speciﬁcally,
Ui(x) = xi − αi
1
2

j =i
max{xj − xi,0}−βi
1
2

j =i
max{xi − xj,0}
where βi ≤ αi,0≤ βi ≤ 1 and α weighs the disadvantageous and β the advantageous
inequality.
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) have players who compare how their payoff relates to the
average payoff: Ui(x)=vi (xi, σi) where σi

xj,x i

equalsxi/

xj if

xj > 0 and 1/n
otherwise. They also assume that viis increasing and concave in xi, vi2 =0σi =1 / n and vi22
<0 .
Both models predict that for a rejection payoff of $10 (for both types of games) the
responder should accept all proposals, the reason being that the difference between 0 and
10 is always larger than the difference between 10 − x and x. For a rejection payoff of $5,
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) predict no rejection since a share of 0 is less than (10 − x)/10,
1<x <9 . 6
Fehr and Schmidt may account for some rejections as long as x − (10 − x) > 5 where
x − (10 − x) is the term that determines the disadvantageous utility in case of acceptance,
which equals 5 in case of a rejection.7
Furthermorebothmodelspredictthattheacceptanceof“unfair”offers(e.g.offerswhere
(10 − x) ≤ 3) should increase as the rejection payoff increases (of course, independently
whether the proposer or the third party receives the rejection payoff).
6 If the responder receives a higher offer, 10 − x ≥ 4, the responder may reject out of a distaste for receiving a
share higher than the equal split 1/3.
7 AnalogouslytoBoltonandOckenfels(2000),therespondermayrejectoffersthatleadtoahighadvantageous
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In the ﬁrst part of their paper, Charness and Rabin present a model of outcome-based
preferenceswhereplayersalwayspreferahighersumofmaterialpayoffsforallplayersand
have an additional concern for helping the worst-off player. These “quasi-maximin” util-
ity functions have the form, for three players, Ui(x) = (1 − γ)xi + γ[δ min(x1,x 2,x 3) +
(1 − δ)(x1 + x2 + x3)], where δ (0,1) measures the concern for helping the worst-off
person versus maximizing the total social surplus and γ [0,1] measures the extent to
which player i pursues the social ideal versus his self interest. This model predicts that
the higher the rejection payoff, the more likely a responder should reject a low offer. The
reason is that in case of a rejection, the total social surplus increases as the rejection payoff
increases.
Furthermore, one could think of a model in which the responder compares her payoff
onlytotheproposer’spayoff,theonlyotherplayerwhotakesactionsinthesegames(though
such a theory would not qualify as purely outcome based). Such preferences predict the
same outcomes for all the TRP games, independently of the rejection payoff. In the PRP
games, the games where the proposer receives the rejection payoff, the responder should
accept all offers, as long as the rejection payoff is $10. For a rejection payoff of $5 or $0,
in the PRP game, we expect the responder to accept all offers.8
5.2. Intentionality models
In models of pure intentionality player i only cares about player j’s payoff when player j
hasbeen“kind”(or“unkind”)towardsplayeri.Foraspeciﬁcmodel,werefertoDufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger which extends Rabin to extensive form games.
Forallgamesinwhichthethirdpartyreceivestherejectionpayoff(allTRPgames),such
a model predicts the same outcome, independent of the amount of the rejection payoff the
third party may receive; since the third party has no action in the game, he/she can not show
any “kindness” and therefore his/her payoff does not enter into the utility of the proposer
nor to the utility of the responder.
InthePRP-$0game(i.e.,thegamewheretheproposerreceivesarejectionpayoffof$0),
the responder has to accept all offers since the payoff of the proposer is $0 independently
of the responder’s action (and the third party, not taking any action, does not signal any
kindness).
In the PRP-$10 and PRP-$5 game, models of intention allow for equilibria where the
proposer makes a low offer to the responder who accepts this offer so as not to “reward”
the proposer with the “high” rejection payoff for his “unfair” proposal.
Amoregeneralmodelthatinvolvesconcernsoverintentionsandoutcomescanbefound
in Charness and Rabin. They suggest a simple, non-equilibrium version of quasi-maximin
preferences. According to the model, a move by the proposer that results in a violation
of quasi-maximin preferences leads to a reduction of the other player’s concern for the
proposer’s material payoff. Such moves either reduce the sum of all players’ payoffs or
8 The responder could reject offers only out of a concern of advantageous inequality. In the case of $5, this can
only occur for high 10 − x (the responders’ share); for a $0 rejection payoff it can occur for all possible offers.
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Fig. 1. Mean rejection rates for each game PRP and TRP, where the proposer or the third party receives the
rejection payoff, respectively; below ﬁnd the number of observations for each offer for each game.
reduce the payoff of the least well off player. In our games the proposer has no such moves
available; hence this version of reciprocity will not have any impact on our games.9
6. Results
We ﬁrst focus on the behavior of the responder. Table A.1 in the Appendix A10 shows
the number of observations for each offer in each game.
6.1. Responders’ behavior
Two main conclusions can be drawn from Fig. 1 (which we will test later on).
Result 1. The responder is more likely to reject low offers when the third party receives
a rejection payoff, than when the proposer receives it.
Result 2. The responder is more likely to accept a low offer when the proposer receives a
rejection payoff of $5 or $10 than when the proposer receives $0 payoff.
We ﬁrst ran a random effects Probit regression for each value of the rejection payoff
(Runs 1, 2 and 3 in Table 2)
Reject = f(a + boffer ∗ offer + bthird party ∗ thirdparty + border ∗ order)
9 Charness and Rabin have a more complicated, six parameter equilibrium version of quasi-maximin behavior
with reciprocity which they do not test with their experiments, and we shall follow this decision.
10 Appendix is available on the journal’s website.Y. Bereby-Meyer, M. Niederle / J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 56 (2005) 173–186 181
Table 2
Random effects Probit regression for the $10, $5 and $0 rejection payoffs and for the TRP and PRP games
Variables Run 1: $10
coeff. (P-value)
Run 2: $5 coeff.
(P-value)
Run 3: $0 coeff.
(P-value)
Run 4: TRP
coeff. (P-value)
Run 5: PRP
coeff. (P-value)
Constant −1.17 (0.047) −0.49 (0.28) −0.16 (0.76) 0.66 (0.21) −1.08 (0.01)
Offer −0.5 (0.00) −0.27 (0.00) −0.43 (0.00) −0.42 (0.00) 0.33 (0.00)
Third party 1.3 (0.00) 1.26 (0.00) 0.46 (0.05) – –
Order 0.35 (0.34) −0.28 (0.35) 0.08 (0.82) −0.3 (0.35) 0.6 (0.02)
$ 5 –––0 .49 (0.01) −0.5 (0.04)
$ 1 0 –––0 .06 (0.76) −0.58 (0.02)
Rhoa 0.38 (0.00) 0.26 (0.00) 0.29 (0.001) 0.36 (0.00) 0.17 (0.006)
Observations 300 300 300 450 450
a Rho is the parameter for the individual random effect.
and then for each type of game (Runs 4 and 5 in Table 2)
Reject = f(a + boffer ∗ offer + b5 ∗ 5 + b10 ∗ 10 + border ∗ order).
Reject equals 1 if the offer is rejected and 0 if it is accepted. Offer  {1, 2, ...,9 } is the
amount offered to the responder. Third party equals 1 in case the third party receives the
rejection payoff, and 0 if the proposer receives the rejection payoff. Order tests for order
effects. It equals 1 if we started with the games where the third party receives the rejection
payoff and 0 when we started with the games where the proposer receives the rejection
payoff. The variable $5 equals 1 if the rejection payoff is $5 and 0 if the rejection payoff is
$0 or $10 (and analogously for $10).
The logistic regression for all rejection payoffs (Runs 1–3) reveals a signiﬁcantly higher
rejection rate in the TRP game (where the third party receives the rejection payoff) than in
thePRPgame(Result1).Thiscannotbereconciledwithoutcomebasedmodelsthatpredict
no difference in behavior according to the identity of the recipients of various payoffs.
Moreover, in the PRP game, the rejection rate was signiﬁcantly lower for the $10 and
$5 rejection payoff than for the $0 rejection payoff (Result 2)11. This can not be explained
in terms of pure intentionality models, according to which the responder should accept all
offers in the PRP game with $0 rejection payoff. It also refutes an alternative model in
which the reference group of the responder consists only of the proposer. According to this
model, the responder should have accepted every offer in the PRP game with $0 rejection
payoff.
The analyses also reveal that in the games, where the third party receives the rejection
payoff (TRP games) the behavior of the responder when the rejection payoff is $10 is not
differentfromthebehaviorwhentherejectionpayoffis$0.However,thebehaviorwhenthe
rejection payoff is $5 is signiﬁcantly different from the behavior when the rejection payoff
is$0.Notethatarejectioninthecaseofa$0rejectionpayoffleadstolossoftotalsurplusfor
allplayerscomparedtothecaseofa$5ora$10rejectionpayoff.Therefore,preferencesfor
11 A Random effects Probit regression in which we left out the $5 revealed no signiﬁcant difference between
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Fig. 2. Mean proposal and standard error for each value of the rejection payoff ($0, $5 and $10) and for each
game.
maximizingtotalsocialsurplus(CharnessandRabin)wouldpredictdifferencesinbehavior.
However, responders were not more likely to reject an unfair proposal in the $10 game than
in the $5 or $0 games, eventhough the rejection rate was higher when the rejection payoff
was $5 than when it was $10 or $0.12 This result is not completely in line with Kagel and
Wolfe(2001)whofoundnodifferencesintherejectionrateasafunctionofthethirdparty’s
payoff.13
Lastly, as expected, for each game the size of the offer has a signiﬁcant effect on the
rejectionrate.Thehighertheamountofferedtotheresponder,thelesssherejectedtheoffer.
6.2. Proposer behavior
Different theories of fairness predict different behaviors of the responder, and hence,
also different behavior of the proposer, whether because the proposer adheres to these
fairness theories or because he wants to maximize her expected payoff. Fig. 2 shows the
average offer and the standard error for each game and for each value of the rejection
payoff.
The offers in the games where the third party receives the rejection payoff are invariant
to the amount of the rejection payoff. The proposer correctly anticipated that the responder
12 A Random effects Probit regression in which we left out the $5 revealed a signiﬁcant difference between the
$10 and the $5 (b = −0.43, P < 0.03) and between the $0 and the $5 (b = −0.49, P < 0.01).
13 They consider a game where the proposer divides 15 between himself and two other potential responders,
where one will turn out to be decisive and the other a dummy. Both responders decide whether to accept the offer,
in which case the division is implemented, or to reject it, in which case the other responder, the dummy, receives a
rejection payoff. The size of the pie to be divided was 15; the rejection payoff took values of −12, 0, 1, 3 and 12.Y. Bereby-Meyer, M. Niederle / J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 56 (2005) 173–186 183
would not accept lower offers with a higher probability simply because a third party might
receive a high rejection payoff (i.e., as expected based on outcome based models14).
Furthermore, the proposer offered a signiﬁcantly lower amount to the responder when
theproposerwouldreceivetherejectionpayoffof$5or$10thanwhenthethirdpartywould
receive the rejection payoff. Presumably the proposer tried to maximize the probability that
the responder will reject the offer.15
7. Conclusions
To clarify the discussion about the nature of fairness, and in particular the importance
of intentions versus solely distributional concerns, we propose a general deﬁnition of dis-
tributional preferences. This enables us to design new games for which both models with
distributionalconcernsandmodelswithintentionalitymotivesprovidetestablepredictions.
The differences we found between the games where the third party receives the rejection
payoff (TRP) and those where the proposer receives the rejection payoff (PRP) cannot be
explainedbymodelsthatarebasedondistributionalconcerns(Result1).Moreover,models
that are based on intentionality type preferences cannot explain the high rejection rate that
was found in the PRP game with $0 rejection payoff (Result 2). Furthermore, we do not
ﬁnd any evidence for concerns of maximizing the payoffs of all players. Hence, none of
the major fairness theories can explain all our experimental results. This suggests a further
need for fairness models that combine both intentionality and distributional concerns.
However, the aim of this paper is not to discredit existing theories. Rather, we want
to broaden the spectrum of games that have been analyzed in an attempt to clarify the
discussionofwhethercertainbehaviorsaredrivenbyreciprocityordistributionalconcerns.
We think that more research is needed in order to understand in which situations models
of distributional concerns provide good predictions and in which situations models with
reciprocityconcernsaremoresuitable.Thismightprovideafruitfulalternativetosearching
for “the true fairness model”.
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that the offers were signiﬁcantly higher in the $5 rejection payoff game than in the $0 rejection payoff game (b
= −2.01, P < 0.0001). The same pattern was found for the $10 rejection payoff game (b = −1.87, P < 0.0001).
No signiﬁcant effect was found for the order. For the PRP game, we also ran a regression in which we compared
the amount offered in the $5 rejection payoff game to the amount offered in the $10 rejection payoff game. No
signiﬁcant difference was found.
15 However, the rejection rate was so low in the game in which the proposer receives the rejection payoff that
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Appendix A. Instructions
See Table A.1.
A.1. Sample instructions
Welcome to the Computer Lab for Experimental Research at the Harvard Business
School. Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experimental investigation on in-
dividual decision making. We will now read the instructions together. After that you will
get the opportunity to study the instructions at your own pace and to ask questions. Please
do not touch your keyboard, before the experimenter starts the experiment.
In this experiment, there are three types of players: Player A, Player B and Player C. We
will now determine your role, which you will keep during the whole experiment. Only you
will know which role you are playing, you will not know the role of other people in this
room. I have here a deck of cards, one for each of you. A third are labeled A, a third are
labeled B and a third are labeled C. On the bottom of the cards you will see a number that
is only relevant for us to connect your terminal to the computer program. I will now show
you the cards, shufﬂe them, go around and I will give one to each of you. When you get an
A, you will be Player A, when you get a B, you will be Player B and when you getaCy o u
will be Player C. You will also get page two of the instructions.
Now we have determined your role, you are either Player A, Player B or Player C.
You will remain in the same role during the whole experiment. No one else will know,
either now or later, which role you have. Let us now turn to page two of the instruc-
tions.
You will play different games, and you will play each game for ﬁve rounds. At the
beginning of each game you will all see the speciﬁc rules on your computer screen.
Once you ﬁnished reading the rules, please click the OK button, so the experiment can
continue. At the beginning of each round a Player A, a Player B and a Player C in
the room will be randomly matched to each other. You will not know (either now or
later) the identity of the other players. In each round, the three Players who are matched
Table A.1
Thedistributioninpercentages(numberofobservations)ofthedifferentoffersasafunctionofthedifferentgames;
PRP: proposer receives the rejection payoff and TRP: third party receives the rejection payoff
Offer Rejection payoff
$10 $5 $0
PRP TRP PRP TRP PRP TRP
>5 8 (12) 12.67 (19) 9.33 (14) 5.33 (8) 18.67 (28) 9.33 (14)
5 13.33 (20) 28 (42) 12.67 (19) 27.33 (41) 42 (63) 32 (48)
4 6.67 (10) 16 (24) 2.67 (4) 14.67 (22) 9.33 (14) 14.67 (22)
3 4.67 (7) 10.67 (16) 4 (6) 10.67 (16) 4.67 (7) 8.67 (13)
2 11.33 (17) 10.67 (16) 7.33 (11) 19.33 (29) 6 (9) 18 (27)
1 56 (84) 22 (33) 64 (96) 22.67 (34) 19.33 (29) 17.33 (26)Y. Bereby-Meyer, M. Niederle / J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 56 (2005) 173–186 185
to each other will have to divide $10 among themselves. In each game, Player A will
propose a division of how to split the money. However, in each game there will be differ-
ent rules that determine what proposals Player A can make. Player A has to conﬁrm the
proposal by clicking the OK button. Player B will observe the proposal of Player A. Then,
Player B needs to decide whether to accept or reject the proposal of Player A. If Player B
accepts the proposal, all the players get the amounts Player A allocated to them. If Player
B rejects, then the ﬁnal allocation is determined according to the rules of the speciﬁc game
you play. Player B also has to conﬁrm the choice by clicking on the OK button. Hence the
ﬁnal division of $10 depends on the choice of Player A and of Player B. Player A will not
know the decision Player B made. Player C will not get any information, and has nothing
to decide. Once Player B decided whether to accept or reject Player A’s proposal, the round
is over and the next round starts.
For example, these are the rules of the ﬁrst game: Player A has to divide $10 between
himself/herself and Player B. Player A can only choose whole numbers, and has to give
Player B at least $1. Player B will see how much Player A proposes to give to him/her.
If Player B accepts, then Players A and B get the amount Player A allocated to them and
Player C will get $0. If Player B rejects the proposal of Player A, then Player A and Player
B both get $0, and Player C gets $10.
Different games will have different rules. At the beginning of each game you will see
the speciﬁc rules on your computer screen.
After having played all the different games for ﬁve rounds, you will be paid for
three randomly selected rounds plus a $5 participation fee and $5 early arrival fee
(if eligible).
A.2. Summary
You will play several games for ﬁve rounds each. At the beginning of each game you
will see on your computer screen the speciﬁc instructions with the rules for this game.
You will then play this game for ﬁve rounds. At the beginning of each round, you will
be randomly matched to two other people in the room, such that in each group there is
one Player A, one Player B and one Player C. In each game, it is always Player A who
will make a proposal on how to divide $10. In each game, it is always Player B that will
see Player A’s proposal and then has to decide whether to accept or reject the proposal.
If Player B accepts, all players get what Player A allocated to them. If Player B rejects,
all players get an outcome that is determined by the rules of the speciﬁc game you are
playing. In all games Player C does not need to make any decision at all. Then, a new round
starts. This means you will be randomly matched to two other people in the room, such that
etc.
Remember that whenever you have an OK button on your screen, in order for the exper-
iment to continue, or to conﬁrm the choices you made, you have to click the OK button.
Are there any questions? You can now go through the instructions at your own pace.
Please sign the informed consent form in front of you. Do not touch the computer before
the experimenter announced the beginning of the game.
Arethereanyquestions?Whenyouhavequestionsduringthegame,raiseyourhandand
we will come to you. Thank you. Please start now.186 Y. Bereby-Meyer, M. Niederle / J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 56 (2005) 173–186
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